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TERMINATING CALDER:
"EFFECTS" BASED
JURISDICTION IN THE NINTH
CIRCUIT AFTER
SCHWARZENEGGER V. FRED
MARTIN MOTOR CO.
A. BENJAMIN SPENCER•
I. INTRODUCTION
In Calder v. Jones, the Supreme Court clearly and succinctly 1
determined that personal jurisdiction is appropriate over a defendant
whose only contact with the forum state is its intentional actions aimed
at and having harmful "effects" in the forum state.2 Illustrating the
extent to which the law of personal jurisdiction had been relaxed from
the time of Pennoyer v. Neff and International Shoe Co. v.
Washington,4 Calder also extended the reach of state courts by
permitting jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants on the strength of
the plaintiffs' connections with the forum state.5 Although Calder
provided a welcome and much needed infusion of clarity and simplicity
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond, T.C. Williams School
of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School, 2001.
I. The published version of the Court's opinion occupies less than four full pages
in West's Supreme Court Reporter.
2. 465 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1984).
3. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
4. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
5. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788 (stating that plaintiffs contacts "may be so manifold as
to permit jurisdiction when it would not exist in their absence").
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into the law of personal jurisdiction by providing a straightforward
standard that courts could apply to evaluate assertions of jurisdiction
over intentional tortfeasors, 6 and by unifying the purposeful availment,
relatedness, and reasonableness inquiries where intentional torts are at
issue, many lower courts have been reluctant to embrace the broad
jurisdictional ramifications of the decision and have opted instead to
interpret the case in ways that narrow the scope of its jurisdictional
grant. 7 The result of this reluctance has been the denial of jurisdiction
in cases where a proper application of Calder's holding would suggest
that jurisdiction is appropriate,8 and the continued utilization of
complex and unpredictable approaches to determining the propriety of
assertions of personal jurisdiction over intentional tortfeasors. More
importantly, lower courts' continuing reluctance to embrace fully the
jurisdictional vision of Calder frustrates plaintiffs' ability to sue in
their home states and impedes the effort initiated by the Calder Court
to empower states to resolve all disputes arising from harms directed
into their territory.
Last June, in Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit illustrated this
phenomenon when, faced with a claim of infringement on actor Arnold
Schwarzenegger's right of publicity, it held that the unauthorized use
of the movie star's image and likeness in an Ohio advertisement was an
6. The term "tortfeasor" as used in this Article refers to perpetrators of common
law and statutory torts, as well as to those who commit statutory violations akin to
torts, e.g. copyright and trademark infringement.
7. See e.g. U.S. v. Swiss American Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 624 (1st Cir. 2001)
(holding that "Calder's 'effects' test is relevant only to the purposeful availment
prong" of a minimum contacts analysis and stating,"whether Calder was ever intended
to apply to numerous other torts, such as conversion or breach of contract, is unclear");
Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 258-59 (3d Cir. 2001) (requiring forum targeting
beyond mere targeting of a plaintiff residing within the forum); Carefirst ofMd., Inc. v.
Carefirst Pregnancy Centers, Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 397-98 (4th Cir. 2003); Brokerwood
Intl. (US.) v. Cuisine Crotone, Inc, 104 Fed.Appx. 376, 382 (5th Cir. 2004)" '[T]he
effects test is not a substitute for a nonresident's minimum contacts that demonstrate
purposeful availment of the benefits of the forum state.' " Id. (citing AI/red v. Moore &
Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 1997); Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Natl.
Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000)."Subsequent cases have struggled somewhat
with Calder's import, recognizing that the case cannot stand for the broad proposition
that a foreign act with foreseeable effects in the forum state always gives rise to
specific jurisdiction." Id.
8. See e.g. Swiss American Bank, 274 F.3d at 625; Remick, 238 F.3d at 259; Young
v. New Haven Advoc., 315 F.3d 256, 262 (4th Cir. 2002).

TERMINATING CALDER

2004

199

insufficient basis for subjecting defendant Fred Martin Motor Co. to
personal jurisdiction in California courts. 9 By so doing, the Ninth
Circuit in Schwarzenegger refused to allow jurisdiction under a set
facts that clearly met the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in
Calder. This error was an outgrowth not only of the Ninth Circuit's
use and misapplication of its own adulterated version of the Calder
test, but also of the court's confusion-a confusion shared by many
courts-regarding the proper scope of state court jurisdiction in the
intentional torts context in the wake of Calder.
Part I of this article will discuss the Calder opinion and argue that
its jurisdictional vision was an expansive one that intended to permit
the assertion of jurisdiction by states over all disputes arising out of
harms directed into their territory. Part II will review Ninth Circuit
cases interpreting and applying the Calder decision, revealing a string
of decisions that eventually misconstrued the jurisdictional ideal
suggested in Calder. Part III will discuss the Schwarzenegger decision
and where the Schwarzenegger court's analysis went wrong, ultimately
concluding that the court's shift of focus to the aim of Fred Martin's
advertisement rather than of the tort allegedly contained within it
allowed the court to find the requisite "express aiming" to be lacking.
Part IV suggests that the Schwarzenegger decision is a manifestation of
deeper doctrinal confusion in the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the Ninth
Circuit's iteration of the Calder "effects" test used in Schwarzenegger
is unfaithful to the standard established in Calder. The Article
concludes with a proposal for a much needed revision to the Ninth
Circuit test.
II.

CALDER V. JONES AND THE "EFFECTS" TEST

Calder v. Jones, similar to Schwarzenegger, involved a
professional entertainer who brought suit against out-of-state
defendants in California Superior Court in response to the defendants'
publishing activity in Florida. 10 Specifically, the plaintiff, 11 Shirley
Jones, brought suit against three Florida residents: The National
Enquirer, its president and editor, and a reporter, claiming libel,
invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress for
9. 374 F.3d 797, 807 (9th Cir. 2004).
10. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 784 (1984).
11. Shirley Jones's husband was also a plaintiff in the suit. Id. at 785.
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an allegedly defamatory article published in the Enquirer.12 The two
individual defendants moved to quash service of process for lack of
personal jurisdiction, which the superior court granted. 13
Subsequently, the California Court of Appeal reversed the lower
court's decision. 14 Although the California Supreme Court denied
review, the United States Supreme Court accepted the case for
review. 15
After stating the oft-repeated standard of International Shoe Co.
v. Washington that the Due Process Clause permits personal
jurisdiction "over a defendant in any State with which the defendant
has 'certain minimum contacts ... such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,'
16
" then-Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court in Calder,
quickly added the modified understanding of this standard as provided
by Shaffer v. Heitner: that in judging minimum contacts "a court
properly focuses on 'the relationship among the defendant, the forum,
and the litigation.' "17 To this formulation the Court added
remarkably-that a plaintiffs contacts could be so "manifold" that the
exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable on the basis of those
contacts alone. 18
Having laid out these principles, the Calder Court deftly summed
up the interconnectedness of the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation by stating that "the [California] plaintiff is the focus of the
activities of the defendants out of which the suit arises."19 The Court
then proceeded to highlight the ways in which the actions of the
defendants were connected with and targeted at the plaintiff as a
California resident. The Calder Court indicated that the story libeled a
California resident concerning her California activities and attacked the
professionalism of the plaintiff whose career was centered in
California.20 Moreover, material for the article came from California
12. Id.
13. Id. at 786.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 787-88.
16. Id. at 788 (quoting Intl. Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
17. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,204 (1977)).
18. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788 (stating that plaintiff's contacts "may be so manifold as
to permit jurisdiction when it would not exist in their absence ").
19. Id. at 788 (citing McGee v. Intl. Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220 (1957)).
20. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788-89.
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sources and the emotional and professional harm to the plaintiff was
suffered in California, her place of residence and employment.21 On
the basis of these facts, the Calder Court concluded, "[j]urisdiction
over petitioners is therefore proper in California based on the 'effects'
of their Florida conduct in Califomia."22
Rejecting the defendants' attempt to focus on the article itself and
its circulation as the purported basis for forum contact and thus
jurisdiction-which would then allow the defendants to align
themselves with the New York defendants in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson-the Court emphasized that the proper focus is the
"allegedly [tortious] actions" of the defendants.23 Unlike a situation
involving "mere untargeted negligence," where an intentional tort is
alleged the wrongful conduct has a target, and to the extent the location
of that target is known by defendants, they can be charged with
intentionally directing their wrongdoing to that place.24 Under such
circumstances, the Court indicated that defendants "must 'reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there' to answer for the truth of the
statements made in their article."25
The Calder Court also made note of the Enquirer's large
circulation in Califomia.26 However, this finding was not central to the
Court's holding because it found jurisdiction to be appropriate over
defendants "based on the 'effects' of their Florida conduct in
Califomia."27 The Court reiterated this basis for its decision when it
wrote, "petitioners are primary participants in an alleged wrongdoing
intentionally directed at a California resident, and jurisdiction over
them is proper on that basis."28
Three important principles that can be distilled from Calder
should be noted here. First, the Calder Court indicated that a plaintiffs
contacts with a forum are not only relevant to a minimum contacts
analysis, but they can be of sufficient quantity and quality so as to

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id. at 789.
Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98).
Calder, 465 U.S. at 789.
Id. at 790 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297).
Calder, 456 U.S. at 789.
Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98).
Calder, 465 U.S. at 790 (emphasis added).
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provide a sufficient basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction.29
Second, out-of-state conduct that focuses its harmful effects toward an
individual residing in a particular state affords that state the right to
assert jurisdiction over the out-of-state wrongdoer.30
Third,
perpetrators of intentional torts can " 'anticipate being haled into court'
32
31
" in the place where the targets of their wrongful actions reside.
These aspects of the Calder holding were welcome developments
in the law of personal jurisdiction for several reasons. First, by
identifying the area of intentional torts as one where defendants should
have clear notice that they will be answerable where their conduct
knowingly causes harm, the Court put plaintiffs in such cases in a
better position to bring suit against such tortfeasors in the plaintiffs'
home states.33 Second, by clearly stating that participants in
wrongdoin§ directed at a state resident will be subject to jurisdiction in
that state,3 the Court furthered its long-held policy goal of giving the
legal system "a degree of predictability . . . that allows potential
defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable
to suit."35 Third, the Court's holding restored a degree of sovereignty
to states, which had started to erode in the wake of Hanson v.
Denckla's �ullback from the expansive view of jurisdiction articulated
in McGee. 6 That is, states were now clearly empowered-as they
should be-to protect the interests of their citizens who are harmed in
their state by the intentional, wrongful conduct of outsiders. 37
Although Calder contained some clear statements permitting
jurisdiction in states where intentional torts have effects, the circuit
29. Id. at 788 (stating that plaintiffs contacts "may be so manifold as to permit
jurisdiction when it would not exist in their absence ").
30. Id. at 89. "Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in California based
on the 'effects' of their Florida conduct in California." Id.
31. Id. at 790 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297).
32. Calder, 465 U.S. at 790. "[P]etitioners are primary participants in an alleged
wrongdoing intentionally directed at a California resident, and jurisdiction over them is
proper on that basis." Id.
33. See id. at 790. "An individual injured in California need not go to Florida to
seek redress from persons who, though remaining in Florida, knowingly cause the
injury in California." Id.
34. See id.
35. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
36. 357 U.S.235,252-53 (1958).
37. Calder, 465 U.S. at 790.
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courts were not too enthusiastic about embracing this view of the case.
The next part of this article reviews how Calder was interpreted and
applied by the Ninth Circuit prior to Schwarzenegger.
III.

NINTH CIRCUIT APPLICATION OF THE CALDER "EFFECTS" TEST

In the Ninth Circuit, under Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Tech.
Assoc., Inc., a plaintiff attempting to establish specific personal

jurisdiction38 must show that three requirements are satisfied:

( 1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate
some transaction with the forum or perfonn some act by which he
purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting
activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws. (2) The claim must be one which arises
out of or results from the defendant's forum-related activities. (3)
39
Exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.

One year after the United States Supreme Court issued its
decision in Calder, the Ninth Circuit in Paccar International, Inc. v.
Commercial Bank ofKuwait, S.A.K., interpreted Calder as standing for
the proposition that "[a] tortious act, standing alone, can satisfy all
three requirements under Data Disc if the act is aimed at a resident of
the state or has effects in the state. "40 This articulation of the Calder
holding accurately reflected the scope of the Calder Court's decision
because it made clear that aiming tortious conduct at a state resident
simultaneously satisfied the purposeful availment, arising-out-of, and
the reasonableness requirements of the minimum contacts analysis. 41
As Calder made clear, the assertion of jurisdiction over intentional
tortfeasors who target forum residents is reasonable per se, which
means that no separate reasonableness inquiry is necessary once it is
determined that a defendant was connected with the state by virtue of
its alleged direction of wrongful conduct toward state residents. 42
38. The Supreme Court distinguishes between "general jurisdiction" and "specific
jurisdiction." See e.g. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408, 414 n. 8 to 415 n. 9 (198 4).
3 9. 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1977).
40. 757 F.2d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 1985).
41. 465 U.S. at 790. "[P]etitioners are primary part1c1pants in an alleged
wrongdoing intentionally directed at a California resident, and jurisdiction over them is
proper on that basis." Id.
42. The Calder Court based its holding on the presence of effects intentionally
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The Ninth Circuit appeared to retreat from this interpretation of
Calder a year later in Haisten v. Grass Valley Medical Reimbursement
Fund, Ltd. . 43 In Haisten, the court indicated that "modification of our
three-prong test is appropriate" in light of Calder, stating, "within the
rubric of 'purposeful availment' the court has allowed the exercise of
jurisdiction over a defendant whose only 'contact' with the forum state
is the lurposeful direction' of a foreign act having effect in the forum
state." 4 In other words, the Ninth Circuit was now confining the
Calder "effects" test to the purposeful availment prong of its three
pronged test rather than permitting the conditions found suitable in
Calder alone to suffice for the assertion of personal jurisdiction as had
been accepted in Paccar.45 Thus, the "modification" referred to by the
court in Haisten referred to a refinement in how it would assess
whether purposeful availment was present in the first prong, with the
"arises-out-of' and "reasonableness" inquiries remaining separately
considered parts of the test. 46 Indeed, it makes no sense to consider
purposeful availment and the relatedness of the contacts to the cause of
action separately because the weight that Calder gives to defendant's
purposefully directed conduct derives from its status as the basis for
suit. The reasonableness prong of the test was revised in light of
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz to require a presumption of
reasonableness where purposeful direction was established, with
defendants being permitted to rebut the presumption if possible. 47
Although Calder's holding clearly unified considerations of purposeful
availment, relatedness, and reasonableness into a single inquiry within
the context of intentional torts, the Ninth Circuit held on to its tripartite

directed toward a California resident without engaging in any "reasonableness"
inquiry. See id. Indeed, the words "reasonable" or"reasonableness" appear nowhere
in the opinion. "Reasonably" appears where the Court states that a defendant must
"reasonably anticipate being haled into" a forum's courts. Id.
43. 784 F.2d 1 392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1986).
44. Id. (citing Calder, 465 U.S. at 789, as the basis for a need to revise the Ninth
Circuit approach) (emphasis omitted).
45. See e.g. Kellner v. Technical Assocs. , Inc., 1 988 WL 33347 at *2 (9th Cir. Apr.
1 2, 1988). "Recently, this court has modified this three-pronged test with regard to the
requirement of 'purposeful availment,' and 'allowed the exercise of jurisdiction over a
defendant whose only 'contact' with the forum state is the 'purposeful direction' of a
foreign act having effect in the forum state." (quoting Haisten, 784 F.2d at 1 397).
46. Haisten, 784 F.2d at 1 400.
47. Id. (citing Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 47 1 U.S. 462 ( 1 985)).
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approach in each of its cases involving intentional torts decided after

Haisten.48

To make matters worse, after the Supreme Court issued its
decision in Asahi Metal Industries v. Superior Court of Solano
County,49 the Ninth Circuit felt compelled to integrate A sahi's
statements on purposeful availment and reasonableness into its
evaluation of personal jurisdiction in the context of alleged intentional
torts. This was first done in Sinatra v. National Enquirer, Inc., a case
involving the misappropriation of Frank Sinatra's name for publicity
purposes. 50
Rather than focusing on whether the defendant
purposefully directed its tortious conduct at a resident of the forum
state as suggested by Calder, the Sinatra court infused its analysis with
the approach of Asahi, which engaged in an extensive analysis of the
quantity and quality of defendant's contacts by assessing such factors
as defendant's " 'advertising in the forum State, establishing channels
of communication for providing regular advice to customers in the
forum State, or marketing the product through a distributor who has
agreed to act as the sales agent in the forum State.' "5 1 Applying the
Asahi analysis to a case involving an intentional tort as the court did in
Sinatra was inappropriate because A sahi involved the very "untargeted
negligence" that the Calder court identified as requiring a distinct
analysis from that engaged in where intentional torts are concerned.52
As a result of this confused cross-pollinization of Asahi with Calder,
the Sinatra court rested its finding of jurisdiction not on the
defendant's intentional harming of Sinatra in California, but rather on
"the [defendant]'s commercial activity in the forum state" and on the
defendant's "pursuit of California clients by advertising, part of which
involved the misappropriation of Sinatra's name in order to benefit the
Clinic through the implied endorsement."53 Coupled with its error of
confining the "effects" test to the purposeful availment prong of its
three-part minimum contacts analysis, the Ninth Circuit through
Sinatra had now crafted an approach to assessing jurisdiction in
48. See e.g. Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1987); Keefner, 1988 WL
33347 at *2.
49. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
50. Sinatra v. Natl. Enquirer, 854 F.2d 1191, 1193, 1195 (9th Cir. 1983).
51. Id. at 1197 (quoting Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112).
52. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984); see Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105
(involving a products liability claim).
53. Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1197, 1198.
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intentional tort cases quite at odds with the approach presented by the
Court in Calder.
Thankfully, Asahi found no mention in the Ninth Circuit's next
series of cases involving personal jurisdiction over intentional
tortfeasors. In Brainerd v. Governors of the University of Alberta, a
case involving alleged defamation, the court stated that the defamatory
communications were directed at the forum (Arizona) and that the
defendant "knew the injury and harm stemming from his
communications would occur in Arizona, where [the plaintiff] planned
to live and work.54 Those contacts with the forum support personal
jurisdiction over [defendant] in Arizona. "55 This conclusion, based
solely on the allegation of directed harm to the plaintiff in Arizona, is
true to the standard established by Calder. Perhaps the Ninth Circuit's
clearest and most accurate statement of the Calder "effects" test came
next in Michel v. American Capital Enterprises, where the court wrote,
"[t]he Supreme Court has held that where a defendant commits an
intentionally tortious act knowing it will have a potentially devastating
effect on the plaintiff in the forum state, a court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over the defendant and not run afoul of the due process
clause."56 However, neither the Brainerd nor the Michel court
departed from the Ninth Circuit's orthodoxy that reasonableness
required separate consideration in the intentional torts context. 57
Only one year later in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Neaves
("Met Life") the Ninth Circuit displayed a moment of clarity in its
application of the Calder "effects" test to a case involving allegations
of intentional torts effected by a mailing into the forum state. 58
Although the court paid lip service to the three-part test articulated by
the Ninth Circuit in each of its prior cases in this area, the Met Life
court in reality engaged in a pure application of Calder, looking only
for the " 'pu�oseful direction' of a foreign act having effect in the
forum state." 9 Applying that standard, the court found that the
defendant "both purposefully directed her actions into the forum state
54. 873 F.2d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 1989).
55. Id.
56. 884 F.2d 582 (table), 1989 WL 102039 at *3 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Calder, 465
U.S. at 788-91).
57. Brainerd, 873 F.2d at 1260; Michel, 884 F.2d at *2, *4.
58. 912 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1990).
59. Id. at 1065 (quoting Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984)).
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and knew the brunt of the injury would fall on [the defendant] who
lived and worked there."60 The court was careful to point out that it
was not the defendant's physical act of sending mail into the forum that
supported the assertion of jurisdiction; rather, the court stated that "the
relevant consideration under Calder [is] the effect of the conduct in the
forum state."6 1
By 1 992, the Ninth Circuit had forgotten what it said in Met Life
and engrafted onto the Calder "effects" test a new factor not previously
mentioned in the Ninth Circuit or emphasized by the Court in Calder.
In Casualty Assurance Risk Insurance Brokerage Co. v. Dillon, the
court faced an assertion of jurisdiction in Guam over a defendant
alleged to have defamed the Guam-based plaintiff through the
circulation of a letter in Indiana. 62 There, for the first time, the court
held that "the circulation of the defamatory material in the forum state
is an important factor in the minimum contacts analysis for a
defamation action."63 Responding to plaintiffs argument that under
Calder, jurisdiction exists wherever the effects of libel are felt, the
Dillon court referred to the Calder Court's mention of the large
circulation of the allegedly libelous material in California and charged
the defendants with knowing the situs of their intended harm "because
the defendants' magazine had its largest circulation there."64 The
Dillon court cited to Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. for additional
support of its view that forum circulation of defamatory material "is a
key factor in determining whether a nonresident defendant has
sufficient contacts with the forum. "65 Then, ignoring the clear
statement in Calder that a plaintiffs contacts "may be so manifold as
to permit jurisdiction when it would not exist in their absence,"66 the
Dillon court, again relying on Keeton, wrote, "the plaintiffs contacts
with the forum is a relatively minor factor in the analysis."67
The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Calder gave no
warrant for inserting consideration of the circulation of defamatory
60. Met Life, 9 1 2 F.2d at 1 065.
6 1 . Id.
62. 976 F.2d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 1 992).
63. Id. at 599.
64. Id. (citing Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90).
65. Dillon, 976 F.2d at 600 (citing Keeton v. Hustler Mag., 465 U.S. 770, 781
( 1 984)).
66. Calder, 465 U. S. at 788.
67. Dillon, 976 F.2d at 600 (citing Keeton, 465 U.S. at 775).
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material within the forum as a key factor in the "effects" test analysis.
It was the direction of wrongful conduct toward a plaintiff and the
effects of that conduct where the plaintiff resided that supported the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over intentional tortfeasors in the state
of plaintiffs residence. 68 In Calder, after stating that "the plaintiff is
the focus of the activities of the defendants out of which the suit
arises," the Court asserted that the defamation "impugned the
professionalism of an entertainer whose television career was centered
in California," and that "the brunt of the harm, in terms both of
respondent's emotional distress and the injury to her professional
reputation, was suffered in California," the Court concluded,
"Li]urisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in California based
on the 'effects' of their Florida conduct in California."69 Nothing in
this conclusion mentions or ascribes any significance to the circulation
of defendants' article within the forum. Furthermore, the Court did not
state that the defendants were aware that the brunt of their injury to the
plaintiff would be felt in California "because the defendants' magazine
had its largest circulation there," as the Dillon court suggested; 70
rather, the court wrote, "they knew that the brunt of that injury would
be felt by respondent in the State in which she lives and works and in
which the National Enquirer has its largest circulation."7 1 This was
the only mention of the circulation of the defamatory material within
the forum in the Dillon Court's statement of its reasoning for the
holding. 72 Circulation was also mentioned by the Court when it cited to
defendants' claim that they were not responsible for the circulation of
the article in California. It is to this argument that the Calder Court
responded that it was not the circulation of the article within the forum,
but rather the direction of intentional harms toward a forum resident
that mattered. 73 Circulation in the forum state found no mention when
the Calder Court went on to reiterate its ultimate conclusion in the
68. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90 (considering the harm felt by the plaintiff in the
forum state arising from tortious activity aimed at the plaintiff to support jurisdiction in
the forum state).
69. Id. at 788-89.
70. Dillon, 976 F.2d at 599 (citing Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90).
7 1. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90 (emphasis added).
72. See id. (focusing on the harm aimed at the resident of the forum state rather than
defendant's connection with the forum state via the circulation of defendant's
magazine).
73. See id. at 789-90.
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case: "In this case, petitioners are primacy participants in an alleged
wrongdoing intentionally directed at a California resident, and
jurisdiction over them is proper on that basis."74 Thus, the Dillon
Court's creation of in-forum circulation as a key factor drifted beyond
the requirements enunciated in Calder. Shadows of this development,
as will later be seen, can be discerned in the Ninth Circuit's denial of
jurisdiction in Schwarzenegger.75
Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries AB was the first illustration
of the consequences of the court's continuing adherence to the tripartite
test that separately evaluates purposeful availment and reasonableness
when assessing the propriety of assertions of personal jurisdiction in an
intentional tort context. 76 Although the court tentatively concluded
that the purposeful availment prong had been narrowly satisfied by
reference to the Calder "effects" test, 77 the court concluded that the
exercise of jurisdiction would nonetheless be unreasonable. 78 Because
the Calder Court made no mention of a separate reasonableness
analysis in establishing that harmful effects directed at forum residents
suffice for the assertion of jurisdiction, the Core-Vent court's
74. Id. at 790.
75. 374 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2004).
76. 11 F.3d 1 482 (9th Cir. 1 993).
77. Id. at 1487; see also id. at 1 493 (Wallace, C.J., dissenting) "[F]or purposes of
this case, a majority of the panel agree that purposeful availment has been established. "
Id. The Core- Vent court's application of Calder was clouded somewhat by the Dillon
court's focus on the circulation of defamation within the forum state. Id. Writing that
"it has not been alleged that California was a primary audience for the medical journals
or that the defendants knew that the journals would be circulated in that state," the
Core- Vent panel distinguished the case from Calder and suggested that this fact made
it a "close question " whether "the acts in question here were 'expressly directed' at
California." Id. at 1 486. The Core- Vent opinion also directly questioned whether
California was the location where the brunt of harm was suffered, a question
suggesting that the location of the "brunt " of the harm is the relevant determiner of
where jurisdiction is permissible. Id. at 1 487. As then-Chief Judge Wallace aptly
pointed out in his dissent, "In Calder, the fact that the author and editor knew the brunt
of the harm from their article would be suffered in California was a factor that weighed
in favor of purposeful direction, but it was not a prerequisite. To the contrary, the
Court held that jurisdiction was proper because 'petitioners [were] primary participants
in an alleged wrongdoing intentionally directed at a California resident. "' Id. at 1492.
Chief Judge Wallace added that "[the majority's] argument ignores one very important
fact: the Supreme Court has already rejected the proposition that the brunt of the harm
must be suffered in the forum. " Id. (citing Keeton v. Hustler Mag., 465 U.S. 770
(1984)).
78. Core-Vent, 1 1 F.3d at 1483.
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declaration that Calder's "effects" test was satisfied, but jurisdiction
was nevertheless still unreasonable because it was inconsistent with
Calder's holding.
Next, in Gordy v. Daily News, L.P. , a case involving the
publication of an allegedly defamatory article about Motown founder
Berry Gordy in a New York newspaper, 79 the court attempted to
minimize the impact of Dillon and Core-Vent by distinguishing those
cases as involving harms against corporate plaintiffs incorporated in
the forum but "doing business either elsewhere or everywhere."80
Where an individual plaintiff is involved, the Gordy court indicated
that "[t]he prime targeting arises, of course, from the fact that Gordy is
an individual who lives in California. . . ."81 The court concluded, "[i]t
is reasonable to expect the bulk of the harm from defamation of an
individual to be felt at his domicile."82 Because Gordy was a
California resident, the court held that Calder supported a finding that
the authors' contacts with California were sufficient. 83 Moving to a
consideration of the reasonableness prong, the Gordy court decided that
a slavish review of the oft-repeated seven reasonableness factors was
not truly necessary.84 Instead, the court chose to articulate its own
reasons for why it felt that the assertion of jurisdiction in this case
would be reasonable. The court cited the following factors:
[The defendants] knew that Gordy lived in California when they
allegedly defamed him; they had good reason to expect that a
substantial impact of their actions would be felt in California; they
are in a business in which they deal with California matters
regularly; the Daily News sends reporters to California; and the
Dail� News serves subscribers in California, though they are
few. 5

Although this separate consideration of reasonableness remains
without any foundation in the approach suggested by Calder, the
Gordy court's analysis did include many of the very factors that made
79. 95 F.3d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1996).
80. Id. at 833.
81. Id.
82. Id. The court indicated that targeting also occurred through the newspaper's
distribution of13 to 18 copies of its publication in California. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 836.
85. Id.
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the circumstances identified in Calder a reasonable basis for the
assertion of jurisdiction over out-of-state perpetrators of intentional
torts.
Separate consideration of purposeful availment and
reasonableness remained the hallmark of the Ninth Circuit's approach
to evaluating specific jurisdiction in an intentional torts context in
subsequent cases. Although this approach was used in Columbia

Pictures Television v. Krypton Broadcasting of Birmingham, Inc.,

within the context of its purposeful availment analysis, the Ninth
Circuit returned to the unadulterated version of the Calder rule that it
had briefly flirted with in some of its earlier cases.86 Because this case
involved copyright infringement, the court had no difficulty finding
purposeful availment based on the Calder "effects" test; the court
wrote, "Columbia alleged, and the district court found, that [defendant]
willfully infringed copyrights owned by Columbia, which, as
[defendant] knew, had its principal place of business in the Central
District [of California]. This fact alone is sufficient to satisfy the
'purposeful availment' requirement."87 The court reaffirmed its
commitment to a straightforward application of Calder (again within
the purposeful availment analysis) in MCA Records Inc. v. Charly
Records, Ltd. 88 Stating the Calder rule as "[o]ne who intentionally
directs a tort at a forum's resident is ordinarily subject to jurisdiction in
the forum state," the court found that the allegations of trademark
infringement against a California corporation were sufficient to support
a finding of purposeful availment under Calder. 89 The court restated
its holding later in the opinion as follows: "Because Holdings and
International have committed an intentional tort knowing that the
effects would be borne by a California resident, the purposeful
availment requirement is satisfied."90
Unfortunately, one year later the court seized on a formulation of
the Calder rule presented in Core- Vent to require that the brunt of the
86. I 06 F .3d 284, 289 (9th Cir. 1997).
87. Id.
88. 108 F.3d 338 (table), 1997 WL 76173 at *8 (9th Cir. 1997).
89. Id. "So long as Holdings and International were aware of MCA's rights in the
Chess Masters and trademarks, knew that MCA was a California corporation, and
knew that their licensing of the Masters and trademarks would result in infringing
products being distributed in the United States, a finding of purposeful availment is
appropriate under Calder. " Id.
90. Id. at *9.
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harm resulting from a defendant's conduct be suffered in the forum
before jurisdiction can be deemed appropriate. As stated by the court
in Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, "[u]nder Calder, personal
jurisdiction can be based upon: '( I ) Intentional actions (2) expressly
aimed at the forum state (3) causing harm, the brunt of which is
suffered-and which the defendant knows is likely to be suffered-in
the forum state.' "91 The problem with this formulation of Calder is
that the Court never stated that a prerequisite to jurisdiction was a
finding that the forum was the location of the "brunt" of suffering and a
determination that defendant had an awareness of this fact. 92 Indeed,
as then-Chief Judge Wallace pointed out in his Core- Vent dissent, the
Supreme Court expressly rejected the proposition that the brunt of the
harm must be suffered in the forum when it decided Keeton. 93
Notwithstanding the insertion of a "brunt of the harm" requirement into
the Calder analysis, the court in Panavision properly focused on
whether there was purposeful direction of harm toward a California
resident in California:
[h]is conduct, as he knew it likely would, had the effect of injuring
Panavision in California where Panavision has its principal place
of business and where the movie and television industry is
centered. Under the 'effects test,' the purposeful availment
requirement necessary for specific, personal jurisdiction is
satisfied. 94

In most of the subsequent cases involving intentional torts the
Ninth Circuit continued to adhere to the three-part formulation of the
Calder effects test from Core- Vent. 95 However, the test was slightly
91. 141 F.3d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Core- Vent Corp. v. Nobel
Industries AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993)).
92. See Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries AB, 11 F.3d at 1492 (Wallace, C.J.,
dissenting) "In Calder, the fact that the author and editor knew the brunt of the harm

from their article would be suffered in California was a factor that weighed in favor of
purposeful direction, but it was not a prerequisite." Id.
93. Id.
94. 141 F.3d at 1322.
95. See e.g. Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Services Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328
F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2003); Northwest Healthcare A lliance, Inc. v.
Healthgrades.com, Inc., 50 Fed.Appx. 339, 341 (9th Cir. 2002) (unpublished); Rio
Properties, Inc. v. Rio Intl. Interlink, 284 F .3d 1007, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2002); Rippey v.
Smith, 16 Fed.Appx. 596, 598 (9th Cir. 2001) (unpublished); Myers v. Bennett L.
Offices, 238 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2001); Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta

2004

TERMINATING CALDER

213

altered in a series of more recent cases. First, in Bancroft & Masters,
Inc. v. Augusta National Inc., the court indicated that the heart of the
three-part Calder test was whether there was "express aiming" of
conduct at a forum state, seemingly de-emphasizing the "brunt of the
harm" requirement in the test.96 Then, the court in Myers v. Bennett
Law Offices clarified that the test required a focus on whether the
defendant "knew that its allegedly wrongful acts were aimed at [forum]
residents" and rested its analysis on that question.97 Dole Food Co. v.
Watts,98 marked what should have been the final nail in the coffin for
the "brunt of the harm" requirement in the Ninth Circuit's three-part
formulation of the Calder test. In that case, the court restated its test as
follows: "The 'effects' test requires that the defendant allegedly have
(1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state,
(3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in
the forum state."99
This elimination of the "brunt of the harm" requirement in Dole
Food was a welcome development and moved the court closer to the
standard articulated in Calder. Explaining the court's elimination of
the "brunt of the harm" requirement, Judge Fletcher, writing for a
unanimous panel, indicated that this component of the test was the
view of "one judge" and concluded, "Because the third judge joined the
dissenter on the issue of purposeful availment, we believe that the
dissenter's reading is controlling in Core- Vent as to the proportion of
harm in the forum necessary to establish personal jurisdiction under the
'effects' test."100 The court further tidied up the Ninth Circuit's three
part test when it elaborated on the "express aiming" prong of the test,
writing, "[t]hat requirement is satisfied when 'the defendant is alleged
to have engaged in wrongful conduct targeted at a plaintiff whom the

National Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000); Maggos v. Helm, 185 F.3d 868
(table), 1999 WL 402448 at * l (9th Cir. 1999); Staton v. Husky Computers, Inc., 176
F.3d 484 (table), 1998 WL 808019 at *4 (9th Cir. 1998). Exceptions where the Ninth
Circuit did not apply the Panavision test include Sebastian Intl., Inc. v. Russo/i/lo, 44
Fed. Appx. 173, 175 (9th Cir. 2002) (unpublished) and Sierra Pacific Airlines v. Dallas
Aerospace, 6 Fed. Appx. 606,608 (9th Cir. 2001) (unpublished).
96. 223 F.3d at 1087.
97. 238 F.3d at 1072.
98. Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2002).
99. Id. at 1111.
100. Id. at 1112-13.
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defendant knows to be a resident of the forum state. ' " 10 1 In what was
clearly a return to much of the simplicity of Calder, this statement
encapsulated the essence of what the Supreme Court had held was
sufficient to support jurisdiction in intentional tort cases.
Unfortunately, despite the analysis of the court in Dole Food with
regard to the "brunt of the harm" requirement, the Ninth Circuit
nevertheless continued to articulate and apply the Core-Vent version of
the Calder test in subsequent cases leading up to Schwarzenegger. 102

IV.

SCHWARZENEGGER V. FRED MAR TIN MOTOR Co.

In 2002, Fred Martin Motor Company ("Fred Martin"), an Ohio
automobile dealership incorporated under the laws of Ohio, placed a
full-page color advertisement (the "Advertisement") in the Akron
Beacon Journal, a local Akron, Ohio-based newspaper. 103 In addition
to several photographs of automobiles available for purchase from the
dealership, the Advertisement included a promise, in large lettering,
stating that Fred Martin " 'WON'T BE BEAT.' " 104 Underneath this
statement was a small picture of movie star and current California
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger ("Schwarzenegger") depicted in his
role as "The Terminator."105 A " 'bubble quotation' " appeared next to
Schwarzenegger's mouth in the picture, reading, " 'Arnold says:
'Terminate EARLY at Fred Martin! ' "106 This statement refers to a
special offer from Fred Martin to customers, inviting them to close out
their current leases before the expected termination date, and to buy or
lease a new car from Fred Martin.107 Fred Martin never sought
permission from Schwarzenegger to use his photograph in the
Advertisement and no such permission was ever granted.108
101. Id. at 1111 (quoting Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1087).
102. See e.g. Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Services Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328
F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2003); Northwest Healthcare Alliance, Inc. v.
Healthgrades.com, Inc., 50 Fed. Appx. 339, 340-41 (9th Cir. 2002) (unpublished).
103. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 2004).
The record revealed no circulation of the newspaper beyond Ohio. ld. at 799-800.
104. Id. at 799.
1 05. Id. The Terminator is a 1 984 film in which Schwarzenegger played the title
character, a time-traveling cyborg; The Terminator remains one of Schwarzenegger's
most popular and readily-recognizable film roles. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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Schwarzenegger alleged in his complaint that if he received a request
for permission to use his picture, it would have been refused.109 Such
a refusal would have stemmed from Schwarzenegger's policy of
refusing all product endorsements in order to prevent an " 'over
saturation of his image.' "110 Avoiding over-saturation is critical,
according to Schwarzenegger, in order to maximize the interest of the
movie-going public in spending money to see his films.111 The
Advertisement ran five times. 1 1 2
Schwarzenegger brought suit in California state court alleging
that the unauthorized uses of his image infringed his right of
publicity.113 In California, celebrities enjoy both a statutory and
common law right of publicity that protects against the use of one's
name, photowaph, or likeness for commercial purposes without his or
her consent. 4 Fred Martin removed the action to federal district court
in California and subsequently moved to dismiss the complaint for lack
of personal jurisdiction.115 The district court granted the motion and
Schwarzenegger appealed.116
A unanimous panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal of Schwarzenegger's complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction.117 Writing for the court, Judge Fletcher identified the
Calder "effects" test as the appropriate vehicle for determining the
propriety of jurisdiction in this case, 1 1 8 but ultimately concluded that
its requisites were not met because the court found there was no
express aiming of activity toward California on the part of the
defendant.119 The panel reached this conclusion by applying the three
part version of the Calder test that the Ninth Circuit articulated in Dole
Food, which requires the defendant to have " '(1) committed an
intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm
109. Id.
110. Id. at 800.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 799.
113. Id. at 799.
114. Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 3344; Comedy Ill Productions, 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal.
200 1).
115. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800.
116. Id. at 800.
117. Id. at 807.
118. Id. at 803.
119. Id. at 807. Judges Kleinfeld and Wardlaw joined in the opinion.
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that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum
state. ' "120 After finding that Fred Martin committed an intentional act
by placing the Advertisement,121 the court found that the intentional
act was not aimed at California. 122 Writing that "the purpose of the
Advertisement was to entice Ohioans to buy or lease cars from Fred
Martin, . . . [t]he Advertisement was never circulated in California, and
Fred Martin had no reason to believe that any Californians would see
it."123 Moreover, since "Fred Martin certainly had no reason to believe
that a Californian had a current car lease with Fred Martin that could be
'terminated, ' " the Schwarzenegger court concluded that "Fred
Martin's express aim was local" and that "the Advertisement was not
expressly aimed at California." 124 Having found that Schwarzenegger
failed to establish the requisite express aiming on the part of Fred
Martin, the court dispensed with any consideration of the third prong of
the Calder test. 125
Although it was the "express aiming" prong of the test that the
Schwarzenegger court found to be unsatisfied, it was ultimately the
court's improper identification of the relevant intentional act that
resulted in its erroneous conclusion that there was no express aiming
such as would render Fred Martin amenable to jurisdiction in
California.126 The intentional acts of concern under Calder are the
"allegedly [tortious] actions" of the defendant that give rise to the
claim being prosecuted by the plaintiff. 127 That is, in Calder it was not
the defendants' act of publishing an article (an act targeted at the entire
universe of the Enquirer's readership) but rather the act of libeling the
plaintiff (an act aimed at its California victim) that gave rise to the
claim and was the basis of jurisdiction.128 In California, the tortious
120. Id. at 805 (quoting Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir.
2002)).
121. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 807.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 807 n. 1.
126. Id. at 807.
127. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984) (finding jurisdiction appropriate
where"the plaintiff is the focus of the activities of the defendants out of which the suit
arises"); Id. at 788. "[T]heir intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly
aimed at California." Id. at 789.
128. Id.

2004

TERMINATING CALDER

217

act giving rise to a claim of invasion of one's right of publicity is the
act of knowingly using "another's name, voice, signature, photogra�h
or likeness, in any manner . . . without such person's prior consent." 29
Thus, in Schwarzenegger, the act that gave rise to the plaintiffs claim
was not the placement of the Advertisement, but rather the act of
knowingly using Schwarzenegger's image and likeness.130 The court
explicitly acknowledged this when it wrote, "the conduct of which
Schwarzenegger complains-the unauthorized inclusion of the
photograph in the Advertisement and its distribution in the Akron
Beacon Journal-took place in Ohio, not California."131 The error of
the Schwarzenegger court then was its contradictory determination
later in the opinion that the Advertisement-not the previously
identified unauthorized use of Schwarzenegger's image-was the
intentional act relevant to its analysis. 13 2
Had the court properly identified the unauthorized use of
Schwarzenegger's image as the relevant intentional act under the first
prong of its version of the Calder test, the court would have had no
difficulty concluding that the second prong, express aiming, was
satisfied.133 The intentional act of using Schwarzenegger's image was
clearly targeted at Schwarzenegger because it was his image that was
being used. Just as in Calder, where the plaintiffs status as the victim
of the defendant's libel meant that she was the focus or aim of the
defendants' actions, and in Sinatra, where Mr. Sinatra's status as the
subject of the false utterance itself made him the target of the
defendants' actions, 134 so too was Schwarzenegger the target of Fred
Martin's actions as the victim of its tortious conduct. 1 35 Because Fred
Martin's tortious conduct impaired the image, reputation, and
pecuniary interest of "an entertainer whose [movie] career was
centered in California" and constituted "wrongdoing intentionally

129. Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 3344 (West 1997).
130. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 806 (holding that the intentional act was
committed when Fred Martin placed the Advertisement).
131. Id. at 803 (emphases added).
132. Id. at 806.
133. See generally Calder, 465 U.S. at 788-90.
134. See generally Sinatra v. Natl. Enquirer, Inc., 854 F .2d 1191, 1193-98 (9th Cir.
1949).
135. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 799-80.
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directed at a California resident," 136 jurisdiction over Fred Martin
should have been "proper on that basis."
V. THE NINTH CIRCUIT' S ADULTERATION OF THE CALDER "EFFECTS"
TEST

Even though the Schwarzenegger court's erroneous outcome was
directly a result of its improper identification of the relevant intentional
act, more broadly the decision reflects the problems attendant with the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the meaning of Calder itself. The
Ninth Circuit's version of the Calder "effects" test has two distinctive
attributes that have caused the court to stray from Calder's original
vision.
First, the Ninth Circuit's test is trifurcated into separate prongs:
An intentional act requirement, an express aiming requirement, and a
forum harm requirement. Although separating the Court's "effects"
test into separate analytical units is not problematic per se, the
articulation of a separate intentional act requirement for a test that was
meant to be applied primarily to cases involving intentional torts seems
superfluous. The Ninth Circuit has stated that the test is applicable to
intentional tort cases 1 3 7 and to cases involving alleged statutory
violations that can be likened to tort cases. 1 3 8 When applying the
intentional act requirement of the test, the court has found the mere
allegation of an intentional tort to satisfy that aspect of the test. 1 39
Calder too points to the "allegedly [tortious] actions" and "alleged
wrongdoing" of the defendants as the relevant actions to evaluate,
rejecting any suggested focus on the circulation or distribution of
1 3 6. Calder, 46 5 U.S. at 788, 790.
137. See e.g. Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 3 03 F. 3 d 1 1 04, 11 1 1 (9th Cir. 2002). "Under
our precedents, the purposeful direction or availment requirement for specific
jurisdiction is analyzed in intentional tort cases under the 'effects' test derived from
Calder v. Jones." Id.
138. See e.g. Panavision Intl., LP v. Toeppen, 1 4 1 F.3d 1 3 1 6, 1 321 (9th Cir. 1 998)
(affirming that alleged trademark infringement is "akin to a tort case " and thus
warranted application of the Calder "effects " test).
1 39. See e.g. Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Services, Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328
F.3d 1122, 1 1 3 1 (9th Cir. 2003 ) (finding the intentional act requirement to be satisfied
after simply stating, "B & C is alleged to have committed an intentional tort . . . ");
Dole Food Co., 3 03 F.3d at 1 1 1 1. "Because it is clear that Dole has sufficiently
alleged that Watts and Boenneken acted intentionally, we skip to the 'express aiming'
requirement. " Id.
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defendants' article in California in that case. 140 Given that the
presence of an allegation of intentionally tortious or unlawful conduct
is a prerequisite to the applicability of the Calder "effects" test
generally, it is a waste of time and effort for courts in the Ninth Circuit
to engage in an analysis of the intentional act requirement where an
intentional tort is alleged.
More importantly, the existence of a separate intentional act
prong permits the court to be distracted into considering actions beyond
the acts constituting the tortious conduct when searching for the
requisite intentional act under the Ninth Circuit's version of the Calder
test. This is precisely what occurred in Schwarzenegger. Rather than
simply stating that Schwarzenegger's allegation of an intentional tort
sufficed, the court engaged in a tortured and confusing analysis of the
meaning of the word "act" under the Restatement.141 Such an abstract
and ungrounded analysis was not only completely unnecessary because
it was obvious that Fred Martin was at least alleged to have
intentionally committed some act as the basis for Schwarzenegger's
complaint,142 but it missed the heart of what the Calder Court
identified as the conduct on which "effects" based jurisdiction is
founded: "Allegedly tortious actions."143
The second troubling aspect of the Ninth Circuit's iteration of
Calder is that the Ninth Circuit's test is simply a means of satisfying
the purposeful availment prong of that court's three-pronged specific
jurisdiction test. 144 Calder did not indicate that its test was so limited.
Rather, in what appeared to be a return to the unitary personal
jurisdiction analysis originally contemplated in International Shoe,145
140. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90.
141. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 806.
142. See id. at 799 (indicating that Schwarzenegger brought suit complaining of
"unauthorized uses of his image"); see also id. at 803 (identifying "the conduct of
which Schwarzenegger complains [as] the unauthorized inclusion of the photograph in
the Advertisement" and its publication).
143. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789.
144. The Three Prongs are: " (1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or
consummate some transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he
purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum,
thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. (2) The claim must be one
which arises out of or results from the defendant's forum-related activities. (3)
Exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable." Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology
Associates, Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1977).
145. See Douglas D. McFarland, Drop the Shoe: A Law ofPersonal Jurisdiction, 68
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the Calder Court engaged in a unified evaluation of the defendants
contacts to determine if jurisdiction would comport with "fair play and
substantial justice" without separately considering purposeful
availment and reasonableness. 146 By simply stating that jurisdiction
was "therefore proper in California based on the 'effects' of their
Florida conduct in California," 147 and that "petitioners are primary
participants in an alleged wrongdoing intentionally directed at a
California resident, and jurisdiction over them is proper on that
basis," 148 the Court thereby determined that jurisdiction on the basis of
such contacts was reasonable. Thus, in the wake of Calder the only
inquiry needed was whether the factual circumstances present in
Calder were present in the case at bar. Such an approach to applying
Calder was reflected in several of the Ninth Circuit's early decisions in
this area. 149
By limiting the relevance of the Calder "effects" test to
satisfaction of the purposeful availment prong, the Ninth Circuit has
robbed the Court's test of its intended scope and simplicity. The
Calder Court, by permitting jurisdiction over all instances involving
intentional tortfeasors in the state in which their victims are injured and
reside, created a broad grant of jurisdiction that empowers states to
adjudicate all cases where their citizens are intentionally targeted by
foreign wrongdoers. As the Court explained, such a scope for state
court jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial justice
Mo. L. Rev. 7 53, 7 63-64 (2003). "Although in recent years the Court has claimed the
test to be two-part, or even multi-part, the original, unpolished International Shoe test
is clearly a one-step, unitary test. A court is not required to find 'minimum contacts'
and 'fair play and substantial justice. ' Neither is a court required to find 'minimum
contacts' or 'fair play and substantial justice.' The opinion requires a court find
'minimum contacts with (the state) such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." ' The connective words
'such that' meld the test into a single, unitary whole." Id.
146. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788-90.
1 47 . Id. at 7 89.
1 48. Id. at 790.
1 49. See e.g., Michel v. Am. Capital Enterprises, 884 F.2d 582 (table), 1 989 WL
1 02039 at *3 (9th Cir. 1989). "The Supreme Court has held that where a defendant
commits an intentionally tortious act knowing it will have a potentially devastating
effect on the plaintiff in the forum state, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over
the defendant and not run afoul of the due process clause." Id. ; Paccar Intl., Inc. v.
Commercial Bank ofKuwait, S.A.K., 757 F.2d 1 058, 1 064 (9th Cir. 1985). "A tortious
act, standing alone, can satisfy all three requirements under Data Disc if the act is
aimed at a resident of the state or has effects in the state." Id.
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because, "An individual injured in California need not go to Florida to
seek redress from persons who, though remaining in Florida,
knowingly cause the injury in Califomia."150 The Ninth Circuit's
version of the Calder test rolls back this jurisdictional grant because it
permits courts to declare personal jurisdiction to be unreasonable even
if the Calder "effects" test is satisfied.1 51 Because the Calder Court
has deemed jurisdiction to be appropriate under the circumstances it
identified, denying jurisdiction where the Calder "effects" test is
satisfied purportedly because jurisdiction would nonetheless be
unreasonable can be described as nothing more than oxymoronic.
Beyond creating a broad jurisdictional grant, the Calder Court
also simplified the process for evaluating personal jurisdiction in the
intentional torts context, a simplification that the Ninth Circuit has
managed to destroy. The issue of personal jurisdiction has grown to
become one of the most frequently and heavily litigated issues in the
federal court system, 152 demonstrating that the predictability the Court
indicated was its goal to bring about 153 has simply not materialized.
Enter Calder, where the Court seized the opportunity to infuse
predictability into litigation involving intentional torts by holding that
where a defendant is alleged to have participated in wrongdoing
directed at a forum resident, jurisdiction in that forum will be
proper. 15 4 Rather than taking the Calder Court's opinion at face value
and enjoying the benefits to the court system that would result from
reduced litigation over this issue in intentional tort cases and from a
simplified analysis for judges where such questions arise, the Ninth
Circuit has embraced an interpretation of Calder that complicates the
jurisdictional analysis in this area by requiring a reasonableness
evaluation separate from the Calder analysis.
Because the
reasonableness analysis is hopelessly subjective and unpredictable,
defendants are encouraged to throw the dice and challenge personal

150. Calder, 465 U.S. at 790.
151. See e.g. , Core- Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries AB, 11 F.3d 1482 (9th Cir. 1993)
(finding the Calder test to be satisfied but denying jurisdiction based on a failure to
satisfy the reasonableness prong of the specific jurisdiction test).
152. McFarland, supra n. 145, at 777 n. 113.
153. See Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)
(articulating its goal of providing defendants with more predictability in the area of
personal jurisdiction so that they could order their conduct accordingly).
154. Calder, 465 U.S. at 790.
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jurisdiction155--even where Calder can be satisfied-in case they can
convince the judge that jurisdiction for whatever reason should not be
asserted. In sum, by continuing to consider reasonableness separately
after conducting a Calder analysis, the Ninth Circuit has undermined
the impact of Calder and deprived plaintiffs-and courts-of the
benefits of Calder's clear rule.
VI. CONCLUSION: TIME FOR A CHANGE

Because the Ninth Circuit's current interpretation of the Calder
"effects" test frustrates the indented effects of the Calder holding (no
pun intended), and because it permits wrong decisions, such as
Schwarzenegger, to occur, the Ninth Circuit should adopt a new
standard for evaluating effects-based assertions of personal jurisdiction.
More precisely, the court should return to the interpretation of the
Calder "effects" test it articulated in some of its earlier cases. The
following test is proposed: Where intentional wrongdoing serves as the
basis for a cause of action, jurisdiction is proper if the wrongful act is
aimed at a resident of the state and has effects in the state. Under this
rule, intentional wrongdoing is aimed at its victim, meaning that
victims harmed by intentional acts can sue in their state of residence.
Whether effects occur in the state will remain evaluated under the
court's existing precedents. This new approach requires the Ninth
Circuit to abandon its adherence to a tripartite test for specific
jurisdiction where intentional wrongdoing is alleged. Under the new
test, if intentional wrongful conduct is the basis for the claim, the
tripartite test is circumvented for a determination of the victim's
domicile and the situs of harm.
The benefits of such an approach will be several: Reduced
litigation over personal jurisdiction in the intentional torts context;
increased predictability for defendants regarding where their conduct
will subject them to jurisdiction; a concomitant improvement in
defendants' ability to order their behavior in a way that will limit their
amenability to jurisdiction; and the protection of unwitting victims
from the burden of having to travel to the wrongdoers' home states to
vindicate harms committed against them, an interest the Calder Court
explicitly intended to promote. 156
155. McFarland, supra n. 144, at 795 n. 181.
156. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 790.
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Applying this test to Schwarzenegger would have resulted in the
Ninth Circuit reversing the dismissal of Schwarzenegger's complaint
for lack of personal jurisdiction. Having pied infringement of his right
of publicity-which involves the knowing unauthorized use of
Schwarzenegger's likeness-the questions would have been ( 1 )
whether Schwarzenegger was a resident of California and (2) whether
the harmful effects of the unauthorized usage occurred in California.
Schwarzenegger was at the time, 157 and still is, a California resident,
and the harm alleged to have been suffered-potentially reduced
compensation arising from the diminution of "his reputation as a major
motion w cture star," and the "overexposure of his image to the
public" 1 8---occurred in California because that is where
Schwarzenegger lives and works and is where his career and the movie
industry are centered.
The limitations on state court assertions of personal jurisdiction
are to be taken seriously. However, courts should not translate these
limitations into a general bias against all assertions of state court
jurisdiction. Simply because the jurisdictional ramifications of the
Calder rule may be broad, that does not mean courts should take it
upon themselves to reinterpret the "effects" test in a way that limits its
reach beyond all recognition. State courts have every right to
adjudicate disputes arising from wrongdoing targeted into the forum at
their residents, as the Supreme Court has affirmed. The Ninth
Circuit-and other courts-should return to the standard originally
envisioned and articulated by the Court in Calder.

1 57. See Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir.
2003).
1 58. Id. at 800.

